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I. INTRODUCTION

Water Markets
and the Cost of
Improving Water Quality
in the San Francisco
Bay / Delta Estuary

There is a growing awareness of the economic dislocation caused by policies to stabilize and improve water quality. A notable and timely example of such regulation is the
restoration of anadromous fisheries and the protection of
endangered species by enhancing fresh water flows into the
San Francisco Bay/Delta estuary, which will ultimately be
accomplished by reducing surface water diversions to
California farmers. This Article presents a method for measuring the short-term economic impacts of reduang agricultural water supplies under different water trading scenarios
and applies the method to the problem of Bay/Delta water
quality regulation. The economic analysis shows that water
trading within agriculture can dramatically reduce the economic impacts of improving Bay/Delta water quality.

II. WATER QUALITY REGULATIONS IN THE SAN
FRANCISCO BAY / DELTA ESTUARY

by David Sunding,
David Zilbernian,
and Neal MacDougall

The San Francisco Bay/Sacramento-San loaquin Delta
estuary (hereinafter "Bay/Delta") is the largest and most productive estuary on the Pacific Coast. Its watershed drains 40
percent of California's land area. supports over 120 fish
species, and includes the largest brackish marsh in the westem United States. In the last two decades, however, the fish
and wildlife resources in the Bay/Delta watershed have
delined to record low levels.' Biologists believe that most
of the decline has been caused by increased exports of water
from the Delta to cities and farms.' As evidence of this
decline, two aquatic species are currently listed under the
Endangered Species Act (hereinafter "ESAK-winter run
salmon and delta smelt-and two other species are candidates for protection.
Two federal environmental agencies have statutory
responsibilities to protect the Bay/Delta watershed: the
Environmental Protection Agency under the Clean Water
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Act, and the Department of the Interior under the
ESA, the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, and
the recently enacted Central Valley Project
lmprovement Act (hereinafter "CVPIA"). 4 All of these
laws, either directly or indirectly, will result in an
increased quantity of water allocated to the estuary
to improve water quality.
This Article assesses the economic impacts of
reducing surface water diversions to improve water
quality in the Bay/Delta estuary. Since agriculture
uses 80 percent of the state's water supply and
urban demands are increasing, the water needed to
meet federal water quality requirements is likely to
be reallocated from agricultural users. A key finding
of this Article is that the impacts of water quality
requirements depend to a large extent on how the
burden for meeting the requirements is allocated
among existing users. How cuts are spread among
users is as important as how much water is taken for
the environment.
Water trading can reduce the adverse impacts
of environmental quality regulations if there are
multiple users whose supplies can be cut and if
there is a disparity in the productivity of water used
in agriculture. This Article begins with an ovefview
of agricultural water use in California, and demonstrates the large disparity in agricultural water productivity. We demonstrate that the least productive
50% of water used by the State's growers produces
only 15% of total farm sales. There is thus ample
reason to believe that water trading can significantly reduce the economic impact of reallocating water
from agriculture by ensuring that only the least productive growers cease production.
The Article next introduces a short-run impact
model for measuring the reduction in economic
activity caused by a cut in surface water supplies to
California agriculture. The model is based on the
notion of asset fixity and envisions that growers will
respond to changes in water supply conditions by
altering their land allocation. This observation is
supported by the behavior of California growers
during the recent, severe drought of 1987-1992.5
The impact model is used to measure the
change in State farm sales in several different water
supply reduction scenarios. First, the model was
run for cuts in surface water supplies of up to 2.5
million acre feet (hereinafter "MAF") annually,
focusing on reductions between 0.8 and 1.3 MAR
Second, the model was run under two water trading
environments: one in which CVP contractors receive
3.33 U.S.C. § 1251-1387 (West 1994).
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proportional cuts in their supplies and cannot
trade, and a scenario in which contractors can trade
among themselves to make up for lost supplies or
sell their remaining supplies. The central conclusion of this Article is that allowing water trading
among growers can dramatically reduce the adverse
economic impacts of improving Bay/Delta water
quality. By maintaining an economically healthy
agricultural sector while improving habitat in the
important Bay/Delta estuary, water trading can help
ensure the coexistence of agriculture and the natural environment.

III. CURRENT WATER APPLICATION PATTERNS
Water availability, amongst other reasons, has
enabled California to become the largest agricultural producer in the nation, accounting for eleven percent of production by volume and thirteen percent
by value. Value is proportionately larger than volume since California growers produce large
amounts of high-value specialty crops and fresh
produce. The soil in California is particularly well
suited to high-value crops, and the warm climate
enables longer growing seasons. The availability of
irrigation water is necessary to fully utilize
California's rich soil and advantageous growing
environment. This becomes apparent in view of the
fact that only two percent of total crop acreage in
the grain belt-Iowa, Illinois, Kansas, Nebraska,
and Missouri-is irrigated compared to twenty-six
percent of agricultural land in California.
Despite the relative scarcity of water in
California, growers in the state continue to produce
a number of crops that have a relatively low value
per unit of water applied. Field crops such as rice
and alfalfa require relatively large amounts of water,
while higher-value crops such as lettuce, tomatoes,
grapes, citrus, broccoli and carrots have irrigation
depth requirements ranging from one to over four
acre feet per acre.
It is important to quantify the disparity between
the water requirements of the various crops and their
relative contribution to agricultural value. Figure 1
shows all crops in ascending order based on value
per acre foot of water used in their production. The
horizontal axis shows cumulative contribution to
total agricultural water use and the vertical axis gives
total contribution to total annual State agricultural
value.6 If water were equally productive in all crops
6. Irrigation depth data: A Dinar et al., Modeling Regional
Irrigation Decisions and Drainage Pollution Control, In NATURAL RESOURCE
MODELING 191-212 (1991); STATE
OF CALIFORNIA
DEPARTMENT
OFWATER
RESOURCES. BULLETIN 160-93: CALIFORNIA WATER
PLAN UPDATE
(1993).
Crop value data: D. ZILBERMAN ET AL, ECONOMIC IMPACTSOF WATER
OUAIrnY REGULATION
IN THE SAN FRANCISCO
BAY/DELTA ESTUARY(1992)
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and regions, then the use-value relationship depicted
in Figure I would be the 450 line. For example, 50% of
the water used by farmers would produce 50% of crop
Figure 1.
Water Use Relative to Value
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sales. Figure 1 suggests, however, that a number of
crops in California use copious amounts of water
while contributing relatively little to the State's economy. Indeed, Figure 1 shows that the least productive
50% of the water used in California agriculture produces just fifteen percent of annual farm revenues.
This disparity in agricultural water productivity
across crops and regions implies that policy makers
should use discretion in implementing policies that
reallocate water from agriculture to the environment.
If water is taken from high-,value uses with no possibility of private exchange to replace lost supplies, then
the cost of improving water quality may be needlessly large. We now turn to a description of an economic impact model of California water policy that measures the economic loss from Bay/Delta water quality
standards in different trading environments.
IV. IMPACT MODEL
A. Modeling Agricultural Production and Water Use
This section describes a method for measuring
the short-term economic impacts of water policy
7. See D. SUNDING ET AL., THE COSTS OF REALLOCATING WATER FROM
(1994).
8. I. Houthakker The Pareto Distribution and the Cobb-Douglas

changes, known as the "rationing" model. The discussion in this Article is mostly informal.7 The
model's name derives from its central feature: growers respond to changes in water allocations by fallowing land otherwise devoted to production of the
lowest-value crops. This approach reflects the fact
that growers have a large degree of flexibility when
they make long-term decisions regarding irrigation
technology and cropping patterns, but have only
limited flexibility in the short-run.
The rationing analysis is motivated by the large
degree of heterogeneity in California agriculture
demonstrated earlier. The Central Valley consists of
many production environments that vary in terms of
weather, land quality, water availability, and marketing conditions. Existing crop allocation patterns
have evolved over time to maximize the overall benefits from agricultural production. At each location,
farmers have invested substantial resources in
infrastructure, including equipment for harvesting,
packing, and irrigation systems. As a result, crop
mix choices are predetermined in the short-run and
are appropriate for individual locations. Reductions
in water supply that change the preconditions for a
successful crop mix are likely to be met with the
only response available to growers-they will cease
production of certain crops by allocating the requisite water to other uses.
In this respect, the rationing model is an example of the "putty-clay" approach to production economics pioneered by Houthakker and Johansen.'
The approach has been refined and applied to agricultural settings by Hochman and Zilberman 9
Putty-clay models treat consumption decisions as
predetermined in the short-run by previous consumption technology choices. For example, the
water consumption of urban households is determined by the type of toilet and shower head used,
the type of landscaping installed, and other factors
that are generally variable only in the long-run. The
notion that irrigation technology choice is conditioned by soil quality and availability of groundwater has been well established."
Another factor motivating the rationing
approach is that there is evidence that there is a
proportional relationship between applied water
and crop output per acre within a given irrigation
technology, at least below a certain level of applied
Policies Using Production and Pollution Microparameter Distributions, in

(1978).
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water (the "crop water requirement"). Water application above the water requirement yields no additional output." This finding implies that farmers'
short-run response to cuts in their surface water
supplies is to either irrigate a field with the quantity of water required for maximum yield or not irrigate it at all.
One additional response available to growers
that may be implemented even in the short-run is to
increase groundwater pumping. The rationing
model is, however, built on the assumption that
growers keep their level of groundwater pumping
fixed. Two basic facts underlie this assumption.
First, growers may have pumping constraints determined by existing well capacity that prohibit large
increases in pumping volume in the short term. This
capacity constraint exists most notably in the
southern and western San Joaquin Valley where the
majority of groundwater pumping occurs. Second,
allowing growers to substitute groundwater for surface water artificially reduces economic impacts in
the short run. There are, of course, potentially large
long-run economic costs resulting from groundwater overdraft, including increasing pumping costs
and possible subsidence. Numerous economic
studies have shown that groundwater mining
essentially trades current gains for future losses.
Average profits over the long-run with and without
groundwater mining are nearly equal. 2 The
rationing model, as configured for this study, constrains growers increasing their rate of groundwater
withdrawal.
In summary, the rationing model has a number
of desirable properties. The rationing approach
accurately captures growers' short-run response to
changes in water supply policy by emphasizing land
allocation. The model is also consistent with the
best scientific information on the crop-water relationship. Perhaps most important, the-rationing
model can be explained easily to policymakers not
formally trained in economics.
B. Modeling Water Trading and Reallocation
Scenarios
The rationing model can be configured to consider various trading and reallocation scenarios.
The basic unit of analysis is comprised of 86 individual water districts receiving water from the
Central Valley Project (hereinafter "CVP"), and the
model considers production of 34 crops including
vegetables, field crops, and perennials. The
11.. Letey et al., A Crop-Water Production Function Model for Saline
IrrigationWaters, in SOIL SCIENCE
OFAMERICA JOURNAL
1005-1009 (1985);
1. Letey & A. Dinar, Simulated Crop-Water Production Functionsfor Several
Crops when Irrigated with Saline Waters. in HILGARDIA 1-32 (1986).
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rationing model is thus one of the most detailed
representations of California water policy impacts.
The numerous individual water districts are
grouped into five contiguous regions with similar
growing conditions: Delta-Mendota Canal, FriantKern Canal, San Joaquin and Mendota Pool, San
Luis/Cross Valley Canal and Tehama-Colusa. In reality and in the model, water is traded within each of
the five regions. Water is thus allocated efficiently
within each of these regions but not necessarily
among regions.
California's water conveyance system is imperfect, resulting in serious physical constraints to
interregional trading. For example, it is difficult for
a grower on the Friant-Kern system to trade his CVP
allotment with a grower on the Delta-Mendota
Canal since the water would have to be conveyed
through the Delta. Further, pumping constraints at
the Delta motivated by endangered species concerns may make it difficult for a grower in the
Tehama-Colusa region of the Sacramento Valley to
trade with a grower in the San Luis/Cross-Valley
Canal region south of the Delta.
The rationing model is employed to measure
the costs of improving Bay/Delta water quality in
two alternative water trading scenarios: proportional
and efficient reallocations of water from CVP contractors to the environment. Proportional implementation occurs when supply reductions are allocated
proportionally to past use in each of the regions;
again, water is allocated efficiently within each
region. Efficient implementation allows trading
among all five regions to determine the final allocation of the supply cuts. In this scenario a grower can
resort to the market to make up for lost supplies or
sell water to another grower if this is more profitable than producing a crop.
Comparing the economic costs of these two
policies measures the potential efficiency gain from
market implementation of Bay/Delta water quality
regulations. While it seems likely that the efficient
scenario will have lower economic costs than proportional implementation, the magnitude of the
welfare gain is very much an open question.
C. Economic Impact Measures
The basic output of the rationing model is the
change in regional agricultural sales, in dollars,
resulting from shifts in water policy. There are solid
theoretical arguments for using gross revenue as
the economic impact measure versus grower profit.
12. M. Gisser. Groundwater: Focusing on the Real Issue, in JOURNAL
OF
POLITICAL ECONOMY 1001-1027 (1983); 0. Burt, The Economics of
Conjunctive Use of Ground and Surface Water. in HILGARDIA 31-111 (1964).
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The change in grower profit is an appropriate measure of social value only when factors of production such as labor and
machinery can be costlessly redeployed in
other sectors of the economy.' 3 While this
assumption might arguably be realistic in
some industries, it is certainly not true in
agriculture. Agricultural machinery and
other non-human inputs such as chemicals are highly specialized. Farmworkers
have an especially difficult time obtaining
employment in sectors outside agriculture. especially in a state such as
California where the vast majority of field
workers are Hispanic and often have little
job training or language skills. Using gross

Table 1.
Aggregate Impacts of ImprovIng
Bay/Delta Water Quality
Supply Reductfon
Lost Farm Revenues
(Sro00)
Lost State Product
l$ODOo

Efficient

4D.217

96.616

Propaoiana

97.379

224.876

Efficient
Prop tionro

46 247
102.857

111.896
226.630

1012
2.245

2.436
5.401

Lost Jobs
WPerson-Years)

revenue as a welfare measure more accurately captures the value of the reduction in economic activity resulting from reduced diversions of surface
water.
The rationing model is also used to measure
the total change in the value of economic activity in
the State and the number of jobs lost as a result of
improving Bay/Delta water quality. These figures are
calculated using multipliers taken from an inputoutput model created 4to analyze water resource
problems in California.'
V. COSTS OF IMPROVING WATER QUALITY
The overall impacts of the two water reduction
plans on revenue losses are summarized in Table I
for two levels of aggregate supply reductions.
Losses under the efficient reallocation are consistently less than losses under the proportional reallocation, demonstrating that the economic costs of
improving Bay/Delta water quality are reduced by
water trading within state agriculture. Due to its
high degree of disaggregation, the model also measures regional impacts from reducing surface water
diversions.
A. Aggregate Impacts
The CVPIA directs that 0.8 MAF of water be
taken from agriculture in an average water year. The
rationing model shows that the economic costs of
this action to improve water quality are only $40
million annually with unrestricted water trading and
nearly $100 million in the proportional implementation scenario. Nearly 2,000 jobs are lost under the
efficient solution, and more than twice as many are
13. R. usr E AL. APPUED WELFARE ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC i e

(1982).
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lost under the proportional reduction.
Table I also displays impacts when 1.3 MAF are
reallocated in a normal year. Additional 0.5 MAF
reduction beyond the initial 0.8 MAF level will result
in an additional $60 million in lost farm revenue
under the efficient solution and about $125 million
under the proportional solution. The impact on
labor will be around 2.400 lost jobs under the efficient solution, and about 5.400 lost jobs under the
proportional solution. Thus, the economic costs of
an additional 0.5 MAF incremental cut is larger than
the costs of the initial 0.8 MAF rellocation mandated by the CVPIA.
Table I also shows declines in State product as
surface Water diversions decline. The State product
multipliers are crop-specific, so the effect of a oneacre reduction in vegetables is greater than a similar reduction in field crops. Vegetables have greater
linkages with the State economy as they require
substantial resources for production, harvesting.
processing and marketing, so eliminating an acre of
vegetable production has more impact on the
broader economy.
B. Regional Impacts
The proportional and efficient implementation
schemes have different regional impacts as well as
different total impacts. These distributional effects
aid in assessing community impacts outside the
agricultural sector. The farm revenue loss functions
are disaggregated among each of the five regions
and are presented in Table 2.
When water supply cuts are implemented as in
the proportional scenario, the San loaquinMendota Pool and the Friant-Kern regions are the
most seriously impacted because so much land in
the southern and western San Joaquin Valley is
14, c~uca IzAh!.-pwArm
c7RM
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mentation scheme allowing interregional trading."

Table 2.
Regional Reductions In Farm Revenues ($'000)
rnnlementatlon

Supply Reduction
0
8,000

VI. CONCLUSIONS

The Bay/Delta estuary is at the
core of California's water conveyance
Friant-Kern
Efficient
2,010
28.542
system, and managing water quality in
Proportional
29,967
86.301
this important resource is the central
policy issue faced by those controlling
San JoaquinMendota Pool
Efficient
840
12.839
water allocation in the State. The
46,816 98,732
Proportional
Bay/Delta is also at the confluence of
two major movements in western
San LuisCross Valley Canal
Efficient
16
23
water policy: increasing recognition of
Proportional
24
718
the environment as a legitimate
Tehama-Colusa
Efficient
36.501
52,554
demander of water and increasing
11.794
16.262
Proportional
acceptance of market mechanisms to
allocate water. This Article demonTotal
Efficient
40,217
96,616
97,379
224,876
Proportional
strates that these two forces are complementary in the sense that market
implementation of water quality regudevoted to production of high-value crops. The
lations can minimize their adverse economic
value of agricultural production drops in these
impacts.
regions by a total of around $75 million dollars
To environmental economists, the notion that
under the 0.8 MAF reduction, and by over $180 milmarkets have the potential to ameliorate the
lion annually under the 1.3 MAF reduction. Under
impacts of environmental quality regulations is
the efficient reduction scheme, production patterns
almost second nature. What is surprising in the
in the four San Joaquin Valley regions are relatively
case of California water, however, is the magnitude
unaffected by the supply reductions, while the
of the savings. If 1.3 MAF of water are diverted from
Tehama-Colusa region is the most affected due to
agriculture's surface water supply, trading can cut
its emphasis on rice and other field crops. Tehamarevenue impacts by more than half. This result folColusa farm sales fall by around $35 million annulows from the huge diversity in agricultural water
ally under the 0.8 MAF cut and by over $50 million
productivity seen in Figure 1; half of all the water
under the 1.3 MAF cut.
used by California growers produces only 15% of all
Table 2 shows the change in the value of regionState farm sales. These conclusions, in particular
al crop sales resulting from the agricultural water
the dramatic savings generated by water trading,
supply cut. The impact calculations for each region
should be borne in mind by all groups seeking to
do not include proceeds from or expenditures on
reconfigure State water policy.
water transfers. Rather, the rationing model only
It is also important to give some context to the
measures the value of the reduction in economic
revenue loss measurements in Table 1. California
activity since the transfer payments net out in aggregrowers produce close to $20 billion in output each
gate. Table 2 indicates where the water for Bay/Delta
year. A $100 million loss from improving Bay/Delta
improvement will come from, and shows where agriwater quality amounts to less than one percent of
cultural production will be curtailed as a result.
State farm sales'. Losses may be high among some
Third party impacts from improving Bay/Delta
groups of water users even though aggregate losses
water quality will be largest in the southern and
are low. Junior water rights holders will bear most of
western portions of the San Joaquin Valley under
these losses.
proportional implementation of the supply cuts.
The rationing model analysis indicates the
Under efficient implementation, third party
importance of trading between growers in the
impacts will be largest in the Sacramento Valley. It
Sacramento and San Joaquin Valleys. Under the
is important to remember, however, that the total
proportional implementation scheme, growers in
third party impacts of reducing agricultural water
southern and western regions of the San Joaquin
supplies are minimized under the efficient impleValley suffer the largest losses from reducing water
Delta-Mendota

Efficient
Proportional

850
8,778

2.658
22,863

.

15. See aLsoL. DIxoN Er AL., CALIFORNIK'S 1991 DROUGHT WATER
BANK (1993).
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supplies. The efficient scheme allows these growers
to buy water from those in the Tehama-Colusa area
of the Sacramento Valley. The net effect of this
transfer is to substitute lost grain production north
of the Delta for lost fruit and vegetable production
south of the Delta. If cross-Delta conveyance is limited by physical and institutional constraints, losses from improving Bay/Delta water quality will be
higher. While some serious constraints on Delta
conveyance may be required to protect Bay/Delta
fisheries, configuring the impact model to allow
unrestrained conveyance measures the total potential benefits of north-south trading.
There are a number of real.'difficult conflicts in
California water policy, a fact to which those currently engaged in debates about the future of the
Bay/Delta estuary can attest, What nearly all sides
are looking for, however, is a formula by which
California agriculture can coexist with the natural
environment. This Article demonstrates that by
maximizing the value of scarce water used to produce food and fiber, water trading can help ameliorate the perceived conflict between environmental
quality and economic activity.
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